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 Abstract 
This paper shows that there exist fiscal strategies that deliver equilibrium uniqueness in a 
monetary economy in which the central bank follows an interest rate peg. In contrast to the 
fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL), such strategies always satisfy a government 
intertemporal budget constraint. The government is able to rule out most prices using 
strategically its fiscal instruments, undercutting the private-market price whenever it is 
inconsistent with the fiscal targets. In the spirit of the FTPL, along the fiscal strategies of this 
paper the government does not follow a rule that mechanically links the fiscal surplus to the 
real value of its outstanding nominal debt. Like in the monetarist paradigm, the fiscal 
authority is forced to blink in face of an independent monetary policy, although in equilibrium 
the former achieves its own targets. 
Keywords: Fiscal-monetary interactions; Fiscal Theory of the Price Level; interest rate peg; 
equilibrium (in)determinacy. 
JEL classification: E31, E42, E61. 
 
 
1 Introduction
Sargent and Wallace (1981) explore a natural way in which scal and monetary policies are related
by highlighting the role played by the government intertemporal budget constraint. A central
message from their paper is that a certain degree of coordination between scal and monetary
decisions is always required, regardless of the particular policy regime at work. Also, scal variables,
such as taxes or public debt, can a¤ect nominal variables like prices or the stock of money only if
the central bank accommodates its policy to achieve a seigniorage target under a scal-dominance
regime. Overall, in their economy the monetarist dictum applies: the price level is always a
monetary phenomenon, in spite of the eventual scal roots of the observed monetary stance.
In recent times, some economists have challenged the above arguments concerning both the
necessity of monetary and scal coordination and the monetary nature of the price level, developing
the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL).1 The cornerstone of this theory is the assumption that
the government can commit to non-Ricardian rules that involve scal-monetary plans that need
not to satisfy a government intertemporal budget constraint. This assumption delivers a number
of results that contrast with the standard monetarist doctrine. Under a non-Ricardian plan, the
monetarist dictum breaks down and the price level is fundamentally a scal phenomenon, with
monetary aggregates playing a marginal role. Importantly, the FTPL contends that the classic
nominal indeterminacy problem associated with a nominal interest rate peg vanishes under an
appropriate non-Ricardian policy.
In this paper we show that there are scal strategies that determine a unique equilibrium price
level under an interest rate peg and that satisfy the government intertemporal constraint under any
circumstance. Thus, we depart from the class of non-Ricardian policies advocated by the FTPL.
Yet, in the spirit of the FTPL, scal strategies that deliver equilibrium uniqueness in our theory
require that the government does not follow a rule that mechanically links the total scal surplus
to the real value of its outstanding nominal debt. In this sense, this paper aims at bridging the
two paradigms at stake. On the one hand, we provide a foundation for scal determination of the
price level based on non-Ricardian elements and, on the other, we do so in a way that is robust to
main criticism against the FTPL, namely, the view that the government budget constraint is only
an equilibrium condition.2
1Some of the seminal works on the FTPL include the following: Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford (1994, 1995)
and Cochrane (2001). Other contributions supporting its theoretical foundations are contained in Woodford (1998,
2001), Sims (1999), Bassetto (2002), Cochrane (2005), Davig and Leeper (2006), and Daniel (2007). Kocherlakota
and Phelan (1999), Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000), and Bassetto (2007) explain the basic arguments of the FTPL.
2See, for instance, the critical discussions of the FTPL by Cushing (1999), McCallum (2001), Buiter (2002) and
Niepelt (2004).
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The basic argument works as follows. Like in the FTPL, we consider targets for government
spending and taxes that are compatible with a unique equilibrium price level, say eP , as maturing
government debt provides a nominal anchor for the economy. Key to our arguments is the idea that
there are two potential sources of value for money (and, hence, for goods). First, money permits
a household to carry out transactions with other households, as private consumption of goods is
subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. Second, a household may also use money to obtain goods
from the scal branch of the government, should the latter decide to give goods in exchange for
money. When the transactions value of money (i.e. the inverse of the price level, P ) falls below
the one consistent with scal targets, that is P > eP ; the real value of maturing government debt
also falls below the target. Then, the government uses such unplanned extra resources to acquire
money from the private sector setting a scal value of money above the transactions one,3 through
an operation that essentially transforms money into a residual claim on the scal surplus. In so
doing, the government rules out such price P > eP as an equilibrium one. The non-Ricardian nature
of this strategy lies on the fact that the commitment to o¤er a scal value above the transactions
one is incompatible with the commitment to make the total scal surplus equal to the value of the
government debt at all times.
We then construct an inverse argument to rule out any price P < eP : In face of such eventuality
the scal branch of the government allows households to deliver goods in exchange for money at a
scal value of goods above the transactions one. While such a disequilibrium situation persists, the
real value of government debt obligations rises and the government is forced to run a scal surplus
above the target, raising taxes as much as necessary to provide an advantageous scal value of
goods.
The idea behind the scal equilibrium selection mechanism of this paper can be traced as back
as Wallace (1981) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1983). In these papers the central bank sets a constant
path for the stock of money and besides the standard monetarist equilibrium there may exist other
equilibria in which money becomes valueless. However, these latter equilibria can be ruled out by
the government if it commits to back money by intrinsically useful objects. Our economy di¤ers
from the ones studied by these authors in an important dimension, namely that the central bank in
this paper follows a rule that leaves the stock of money indeterminate. Such indeterminacy allows
certain scal strategies, as the one outlined above, to operate as an equilibrium selection device.
In turn, the government rules out some prices by managing its scal surpluses strategically, rather
than by violating its budget constraint.
3We are borrowing the transactions and scal values terminology from Diamond and Rajan (2006).
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We develop our arguments in the context of a non-Walrasian monetary economy. This latter
feature is motivated by Bassettos (2002) criticism of the FTPL, who argues that the Walrasian
framework is not the appropriate one to deal with a theory that critically depends on assumptions
about the o¤-equilibrium dynamics of the economy. In particular, the price formation mechanism
is explicitly modelled by means of a system of trading posts or marketsat which goods and assets
are traded pairwise. Such structure facilitates the lay out of the set of constraints that market
participants face at each stage of the trade-consumption process.
Apart from other details of the modeling strategy, we depart from Bassettos cash-less assump-
tion and build up an economy in which money exists physically and is traded for goods (and goods
for money). A key motivating idea in this paper is that the forces behind the equilibrium price
determination of a non-at asset (like a non-defaultable bond) need not to coincide with those
behind the determination of a at asset. In the above terminology, a bond only has a scal value
while money may have a transactions value even if its scal value is zero.
In particular, we employ a version of the one-period monetary economy presented by Gale
(2005), augmented with scal variables, in which a central bank lends money to the households and
charges a positive interest rate on its loans.4 Such framework allows for a transparent description
of the actions taken by the central bank and the scal authority, and of the constraints that an
independent monetary policy poses on scal policy. An important assumption maintained in this
paper is that the central bank never monetizes scal decits. To our knowledge, no previous paper
has attempted to analyze the interactions between independent scal and monetary authorities by
fully specifying government strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the monetary model and presents the
FTPLs arguments in a Walrasian setting and section 3 contains a description of the non-Walrasian
economy. Section 4 develops the equilibrium uniqueness result under a non-Ricardian government
strategy. Section 5 contains a detailed discussion of such result in the light of the some of the
previous literature and briey discusses some extensions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Ricardian and non-Ricardian policies
In this section we rst provide the baseline monetary model employed throughout and then describe
the FTPL arguments in that context.
4The one-period simplication has been used by both proponents and opponents of the FTPL, see e.g. Christiano
and Fiztgerald (2000), Niepelt (2004), and some examples in Cochrane (2005). As shown in section 2, our one-period
economy is valid to capture the main insights of both the traditional monetarist and the FTPL arguments.
3 BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0741 
Consider an economy inhabited by a continuum of identical households of measure one, a central
bank and a scal authority (henceforth, the government). Each household is endowed with one
unit of the consumption good and b maturing government bonds denominated in terms of monetary
units (henceforth, dollars). Money is useful in this economy since households consumption is
subject to a liquidity constraint. Consumption is the only argument in the households utility
function, u (c) ; whose rst derivative is strictly positive.
The central bank is the monopolistic supplier of money in this economy. It lends dollars to
the households before trade takes place at a cost of r > 0 dollars per dollar borrowed. Thus, r
is naturally interpreted as the monetary policy instrument. A positive interest rate implies that
the central bank obtains some prots in the form of consumption goods. We refer to these prots
as seigniorage and assume that the central bank mechanically passes it to the government. The
latter also collects lump-sum taxes from the households. Taxes and seigniorage nance government
spending as well as the repayment of outstanding government bonds. Thus, the government ow
of funds constraint is:
B
P
= T + S  G+ B
s
P
(1)
where B > 0 is the initial stock of nominal government bonds, P is the price level, T  0 are taxes,
S  0 is seigniorage, G  0 is government spending, and Bs is the government supply of new bonds
that, given that the economy only lasts one period, are never redeemed. Combining the funds
constraint (1) with the transversality condition BS = 0; which states that the government does
not supply new debt, we obtain the government intertemporal budget constraint which dictates
that the net present value of inows must equal the net present value of outows:
B
P
= T + S  G (2)
We model the monetary exchange process by means of division of the entire period into several
sub-periods or stages. As in Gale (2005), we divide the period into three stages:
Stage 1 : Households borrow money from the central bank.
Stage 2 : The central bank injects as much money as needed by the households to repay the
monetary loans made in stage 1 and exchange of goods for dollars and dollars for goods takes
place.
Stage 3 : The government collects taxes and redeems bonds, households repay their loans to the
central bank and private consumption and government spending take place.
Implicit in the above sequence is the fact that money is only used by households to acquire
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their consumption bundles. While keeping usage of money at a minimum level is inessential for the
characterization of the Walrasian equilibria described later in this section, it greatly simplies the
analysis of the non-Walrasian version of this economy developed in the next section. In particular,
in this section we assume that all taxes are paid using goods. This implies that the government
enters stage 3 with no dollars but with the obligation to redeem dollar-linked bonds. Consistently
with this, we assume that the government commits to redeem each bond in exchange for 1=P
consumption goods which can be directly consumed. That is, no further monetary exchange is
needed for their consumption, or equivalently, maturing bonds are as liquid as dollars. Thus, the
liquidity constraint takes the following form,
c  b
P
 m
P
(3)
where m denotes the agents money balance borrowed from the central bank at the rst stage.
Implicit in this constraint is the assumption that dollars received by a household in exchange for
his endowment cannot be used to acquire other householdsgoods. We use lower-case letters to
denote variables referred to individual household choices and upper-case letters to denote their
aggregate counterparts.5
The representative agent faces a decision problem in which he must choose a monetary loan, m;
and a level of consumption, c; to maximize his utility function subject to the liquidity constraint
(3) and the following ow of funds constraint,
Pc+ rm  b+ P (1  T ) (4)
For strictly positive interest rates the ow of dollars that an agent receives in exchange for selling
his endowment at stage 2 must exceed the amount borrowed from the central bank at stage 1.
As such di¤erence persists at the aggregate, the central bank must inject additional money in
an amount equivalent to the interest payment. That is, denoting by M the (positive and nite)
total amount of dollars borrowed by all agents in stage 1, the central bank injects M dollars in
the second stage, such that the settlement of monetary loans is just attainable, in the sense that
M = rM . Thus, seigniorage is
S =
rM
P
(5)
5For simplicity, government spending is not subject to any liquidity requirement. We briey discuss the implica-
tions of relaxing the assumptions that taxes are payable in goods, that the government delivers goods in exchange
for maturing bonds and that government spending is not subject to any liquidity requirement in section 5.
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Denition 1 (competitive equilibrium).6 A competitive equilibrium is an allocation (C;M) ; a
vector of interest rate and prices (r; P ) ; and a government policy (M;T ) ; such that
(i) Given (r; P ) and (M;T ), the allocation (C;M) maximizes u (c) subject to constraints (3) and
(4).
(ii) The government constraint (2) is satised.
(iii) Markets clear, i.e. C +G = 1; and m =M:
In all cases analyzed later, we consider a monetary policy rule consisting of the central bank
choosing an arbitrary positive interest rate, r; and simultaneously committing to select M so as
to meet the exact-attainability criterion listed above, i.e. M = rM: We refer to this rule as an
interest rate peg. As for the scal policy rule, we introduce the following denition:
Denition 2 (Ricardian vs non-Ricardian policies). A government policy is Ricardian if it
is formulated in such a way that the intertemporal budget constraint (2) is satised for any price:
It is non-Ricardian if that equation is only satised in equilibrium.7
The following two propositions illustrate, by means of simple scal policies, the implications
of these two alternative classes of policies in terms of the (in)determinacy of the equilibrium price
level, as they are usually presented in the literature.8
Proposition 1 (Canonical Ricardian solution). Consider a Ricardian policy such that the
central bank follows a interest peg rule and the government sets a price-invariant tax T: Then, the
price level, P; and the level of government spending, G, are indeterminate.
Proof. Given the exogenous choices for r and T a competitive equilibrium is characterized by
the following conditions:
(i) For given P and T; household constraints (3) and (4) hold as equalities.
(ii) Given M; the central bank injects rM dollars in the second stage.
(iii) Given P and rM; the government sets G so that the government budget constraint (2) holds.
(iv) Markets (goods and dollars) clear.
Let us consider an arbitrary positive and nite price PR: It can be veried that there exists a
6All possible equilibria in this economy are symmetric.
7This denition corresponds to the one given by Woodford (1995).
8We use the term canonical here with reference to the class of Walrasian solutions of the model when it is
assumed that the government can implement a Ricardian or non-Ricardian plan as just dened. Whether this a
sensible assumption to be held under any circumstance is at the heart of the discussion on the validity of the FTPLs
postulates, an issue which is analyzed in detail in the following sections.
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competitive equilibrium in which the government sets a tax T; associated with such price, provided
a sign condition holds. First, from the goods market clearing condition we learn that equilibrium
households consumption satises C = 1   G: Then, using (3) holding as an equality and the
government budget constraint (2), we can solve for a unique level of government spending, for a
given PR,
G =
T + r
1 + r
  B
PR
(6)
The solution of this equation can be a part of a competitive equilibrium as long as G  0; which
tantamounts to impose that9
PR  Pmin  1 + r
T + r
B (7)
Finally, equation (6) can then be exploited together with (3) to solve for the equilibrium stock of
nominal balances:
M =
1  T
1 + r
PR (8)
Proposition 1 makes clear that nominal indeterminacy associated with a monetary rule that
leaves the determination of the stock of money, M; subject only to demand forces extends to scal
indeterminacy under a Ricardian plan. As the real value of some scal outows (namely, maturing
bonds net of seigniorage) varies with the price level, the government must set a policy that makes
its level of spending a function of the price, as made explicit by (6). This classical indeterminacy
problem is resolved by the FTPL which exploits the latter relationship between nominal and real
indeterminacy.
Proposition 2 (Canonical non-Ricardian solution). Consider a non-Ricardian policy such
that the central bank follows an interest peg rule and the government sets some price-invariant
levels of spending and taxes. Then, provided a sign condition holds, there is unique equilibrium
price level consistent with such policy.
Proof. The conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium listed in the proof of
proposition 1 are still required, except number (iii), as the scal rule now includes an exogenous
tax. Using the market clearing and households optimality conditions, we learn that seigniorage in
9 If the price would fall below Pmin; then the government would have to raise taxes above the initial target, even
if G = 0: For the ease of the exposition, we only consider prices that satisfy the lower bound in (7), so that in
equilibrium the government does implement an exogenous tax. We follow this convention regardless of the nature of
the policy, Ricardian or non-Ricardian. Also, notice that, since money is a at asset, nothing in principle precludes
an equilibrium in which money is valueless. We henceforth restrict attention to monetary equilibria (i.e. equilibria
with nite P ).
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equilibrium is given by
S = r

1 G  B
P

This expression shows that in equilibrium the central bank earns an amount of seigniorage equal
to the interest rate times total monetary lending in real terms, which corresponds to the total
economys endowment (i.e. unity) minus the proportion of endowment that does not require
monetary exchange (i.e. government spending and the value of maturing bonds). Plugging this
expression into the government budget constraint (2) and rearranging yields
B
P
=
T + r
1 + r
 G (9)
As every term in the right-hand side of this equality is exogenously set by scal (G and T ) and
monetary policy (r), and B > 0; there is a unique nite positive P consistent with this policy
rule provided T+r1+r  G > 0; which is the sign condition referred in the proposition: The solution is
completed by solving for the equilibrium ow of dollars which is uniquely given from (8).
In providing supportive arguments, the proponents of the FTPL justify the interpretation of
(2) as an additional separate equilibrium condition either by accepting that the government is
limited on its actions by an intertemporal budget constraint, but with the extra qualication that
the government is a big player, so that it need not to take prices as given (see Woodford (1998,
2001)), or even by denying that such a constraint exists at all, arguing that (2) must be interpreted
as a government valuation equationrather than as a constraint. Under this latter approach the
government is viewed as a private rm whose equity is priced according to the future stream of
prots, where an analogy is drawn between a rms equity and the dollar-denominated government
obligations, B=P; and between the rms prot stream and the governments total surpluses (the
RHS of (2)). From this perspective, the plausibility of non-Ricardian policies is accepted as it is
the general idea that the future prots of a rm need not to be inuenced by the current price of its
shares and, therefore, equation (2) is only satised when the stock of the rm is correctly valued.
This stock-analogy argument can be found, e.g., in Cochrane (2005), Christiano and Fiztgerald
(2000) and Sims (1999).
Thus, most of the debate around the FTPL has centered on the following question: is it
legitimate to treat (2) as a separate equilibrium condition rather than as a constraint? In what
follows, we rst provide an economic environment that allows for an uncontroversial distinction
between equilibrium conditions and constraints and then show that the government can implement
an exogenous level of spending and taxes (as in the policy of proposition 2) even if its actions are
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subject to a budget constraint like (2), as in proposition 1.
3 A non-Walrasian Version of the Economy
In this section we depart from the Walrasian paradigm. The central idea is that markets are
conceived as specialized trading posts in which market participants trade goods for assets and
assets for goods. In particular, we consider a market concept similar to the one employed by
Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992, 2006) and Bassetto (2002), and assume that a single pair of objects
are exchanged at each market and participation is done by submission of specialized bids. Other
elements, like preferences, initial endowments of goods and government bonds, are kept unchanged
with respect to the economy of section 2. A liquidity constraint similar to (3) applies in this
environment as well.
In order to maintain the competitive scheme for the household sector of the Walrasian economy,
we assume that households individual actions are not observed by other households although
aggregate actions, including the government ones, are common knowledge. As a consequence, each
household anticipates that his individual actions will not bear any e¤ect on any other agents
actions and, hence, on prices. We assume that each household that wishes to participate in a
market must submit an unconditional bid containing the amount of dollars or goods that he wants
to sell.
At the core of the mechanisms described later is the idea that the government may participate
in some trading posts by setting prices together with upper limits in the volume of trade, rather
than unconditionally o¤ering quantities. The fact that the government is a large player makes
the consideration of such class of bids a relevant issue at the aggregate level.10 This, however,
does not interfere with the notion that budgetary restrictions that impose that the total amount
of resources employed to back bids must be su¢ cient to honor the corresponding deliveries under
any circumstance apply equally to all agents, irrespectively of their size which is the convention
followed here.
In the Walrasian economy of the previous section dollars were only used to carry out two types
of transactions: (i) goods being exchanged for dollars (and dollars for goods) between households,
as prescribed by the liquidity constraint (3), and, (ii) households selling goods to the central bank
in exchange for dollars. Here we retain the assumption that the government redeems maturing
10 In a symmetric vein, we could allow a private agent to participate in a post by xing prices and upper volumes
of sold quantities. Yet, as long as such upper bounds are small at the aggregate, the equilibrium consequences will
also be negligible.
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bonds for goods directly, but allow it to also exchange goods for money and vice versa. Although
such transactions will never take place in the equilibria analyzed later, they will be an important
part of what we describe below as a non-Ricardian scal strategy. Importantly, although we
consider government transactions involving the exchange dollars, we maintain the assumption that
the central bank chooses and implements its monetary policy independently of the government
actions. In particular, we preclude any monetary loan to the government at all times, although we
now allow for taxes payable in dollars.11 Also, we do not consider the case in which the government
supplies new bonds and treat the transversality condition Bs = 0 as an identity.
The role of the central bank is the same as in section 2. It sets an exogenous interest rate,
supplies as many dollars as requested and then injects the exact amount of money that borrowers
need to pay back their money withdrawals with interest, passing seigniorage to the government.
The sequence of events in this economy closely follows that of section 2:
Stage 1. Households start with one unit of consumption goods and b government bonds. The
central bank sets a nominal interest rate r > 0 and households borrow m dollars.
Stage 2. Markets open and participants make their bids. We consider the following markets,
each of which is characterized by the form of the bids submitted by the market participants:
Market 1. In this market (the private market) households exchange goods for dollars and dollars
for goods. Each household may submit an unconditional sale bid for m1c dollars and a sale bid
for c1m goods. We use subscripts to denote the object that the participant wishes to obtain in
exchange for its sale bid (subscripts m; c; and b; stand for dollars, goods and government bonds,
respectively) and later on we employ the superscript g to refer to bids made by the government.
Numerical superscripts denote the corresponding market .The price level in this market, denoted
by P , is the ratio of the submitted quantities of goods and dollars,
P =
M1c
C1m
(10)
The inverse of the price P is naturally interpreted as the transactions value of money.
Market 2. The central bank makes sale bids of rM dollars in exchange for goods, where M is the
total amount of dollars borrowed in stage 1. Each household may submit an unconditional sale
11We introduce here this form of taxation in order to allow the government to obtain dollars that at some point
may be used to acquire consumption goods in a specialized trading post. In a more general setting, with a more
sophisticated nancial market, the government could also obtain dollars from private banks and from the sale of new
debt.
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bid for c2m goods. Thus, price in this market is given by
P2 =
rM
C2m
(11)
Market 3. The government sets unilaterally the price, P3; at which it is ready to buy dollars
in exchange for goods, and each household may submit a sale bid of m3c dollars, subject to the
following constraint
m1c +m
3
c  m (12)
Later on, we will allow for bids in which the government sets a price that may vary with some
other variables in the economy. The government may also set an upper bound to the amount
of goods delivered in exchange for dollars. We write the amount of goods actually pledged by
the government, Cg;3m ; as C
g;3
m = min
n
M3c =P3; C
g;3
m
o
; where C
g;3
m represents the aforementioned
upper bound. Whenever Cg;3m = C
g;3
m ; the exchange price, P3, is determined as in a post with
unconditional bids, i.e. P3 =
M3c
C
g;3
m
: Thus, we can write the corresponding market clearing condition
as
P3C
g;3
m =M
3
c (13)
bearing in mind that P3 is set by the government if C
g;3
m < C
g;3
m and endogenously if C
g;3
m = C
g;3
m .
We henceforth refer to the inverse of P3 as the scal value of money.
Market 4 . In this post the government sets the price, P4, at which it is ready to sell dollars in
exchange for goods. Denoting by C4m the amount of goods bid by households, the government
submits a quantity of dollars Mg;4c , given by M
g;4
c = min
n
P4C
4
m; M
g;4
c
o
; where M
g;4
c stands for
the maximum amount of dollars that the government is willing to sell on this post. As in market 3,
ifMg;4c =M
g;4
c ; then the exchange price in this post, P4; is determined according to P4 =M
g;4
c =C
4
m:
As before, the market clearing condition can be written generally as
P4C
4
m =M
g;4
c (14)
and P4 is referred as the scal value of goods.
For all the markets above and whenever the government does not set the price directly, we
assume that prices are not dened if no bids are submitted in either side and sale bids that do not
meet a counterpart are wasted. Otherwise, markets clear continuously regardless of the submitted
bids.
Stage 3. The following events take place:
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(i) The government collects taxes in the form of goods, T1 2 [0; 1] and dollars, T2  0:
(ii) The government supplies goods in exchange for maturing bonds, whose value is linked to
the transaction value of the dollar, P: Importantly, we assume that the government commitment
to redeem bonds at their face value applies for any price level, P; and independently of whether
the price is an equilibrium one or not. Thus, the amount of goods Cgb ; given in exchange for bonds
presented for redemption, Bc, is computed as
Cgb =
Bc
P
(15)
A household may submit bc bonds for redemption subject to
bc  B (16)
(iii) The commitments to deliver goods and dollars made in previous stages are fullled.
(iv) Consumption and government spending take place.
Figure 1 summarizes the set of households and government actions during the period. The
following ow of funds constraints ensure that every participant has enough resources to honor
the central bank loans and sale bids under any circumstance:
- Households ow of goods constraint:12
1 +
m1c
P
+
m3c
P3
+
bc
P
 T1 + c1m + c2m + c4m (17)
The terms on the LHS are the households inows of goods: the initial endowment, goods obtained
in exchange for dollars in markets 1 and 3 plus goods received in exchange for maturing bonds.
The RHS contains the outows of goods: tax payments, and sale bids in markets 1, 2 and 4.
- Households ow of dollars constraint:
m+ Pc1m + P2c
2
m + P4c
4
m  (1 + r)m+m1c +m3c + T2 (18)
The inows of dollars for the household are collected on the LHS: initial borrowing from the central
bank plus dollars received in exchange for goods in markets 1, 2 and 4. The RHS contains the
outows: redemption of initial central bank loan plus interest, dollars used in sale bids in markets
12 In contrast to the Walrasian economy, we now consider the ows of goods and dollars separately as bids made
in stage 2 convey the literal commitment to deliver a particular object.
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Household actions
Stage 1: - Borrow m dollars from the central bank
Stage 2: - Trade:
(market 1): sell mc1 dollars and cm1 goods to other households
(market 2): sell mc2 dollars to the central bank
(market 3): sell mc3 dollars to the government
(market 4): sell cm4 goods to the government
Stage 3: - Pay taxes
- Redeem government bonds
- Deliver and receive goods and dollars
- Repay monetary loan from the central bank
- Consume
Government actions
Stage 2: - Trade:
(market 3): set P3 and C m
g,3
(market 4): set P4 and Mc
g,4
Stage 3: - Collect taxes
- Repay bonds
- Deliver and receive goods and dollars
- Consume
Figure 1: Timing and actions
1 and 3 and the dollar tax installment.
- Government ow of goods constraint:
T1 + C
2
m + C
4
m 
Bc
P
+
M3c
P3
(19)
Inows of goods on the LHS include taxes, goods obtained by the central bank in market 2 (seignior-
age) and households sales of goods in market 4. As for outows, the government uses goods to
redeem bonds and to obtain dollars market 3.
- Government ow of dollars constraint:
M3c + T2 = P4C
4
m (20)
which states that the number of dollars obtained in market 3, M3c ; plus the dollar tax installment
equal the amount of dollars required to support the government sale bids in market 4, P4C4m: Thus,
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we rule out the possibility that the government retains dollars at this stage since that would imply
that the households sector at the aggregate cannot return the central bank loans with interest.13
Using the ow of goods constraint (17), we learn that household consumption, c; satises the
following restriction
c  1 + m
1
c
P
+
m3c
P3
+
bc
P
  T   c1m   c2m   c4m (21)
and the following liquidity constraint that makes explicit that only goods obtained in exchange for
assets can be consumed,
c  m
1
c
P
+
m3c
P3
+
bc
P
(22)
Using (19), we can write government spending as a residual of the government budget,
G = T1 + C
2
m  
Bc
P
+ C4m  
M3c
P3
(23)
The sign restrictions in (17) and (19) ensure that c  0 and G  0; respectively.
We next provide the equilibrium notion used for this economy.
Denition 3 (symmetric competitive equilibrium).14 A symmetric competitive equilibrium
is an allocation

C;C1m; C
2
m; C
4
m;M;M
1
c ;M
3
c ; Bc;M;T1; T2; G;C
g;3
m ; C
g
b ;M
g;4
c

; and interest rate
and prices (r; P; P2; P3; P4), such that,
(i) Given (r; P; P2; P3; P4) and (M;T1; T2) ; the allocation
 
C;C1m; C
2
m; C
4
m;M;M
1
c ;M
3
c ; Bc

solves
the household optimization problem:
max u (c)
fc;c1m;c2m;c4m;m;m1c ;m3c ;bc2R8+g
subject to (12), (16), (17), (18), (21) and (22).
(ii) The governments solvency constraints (19) and (20) are satised.
(iii) Markets clear, i.e. equations (10), (11), (13) and (14) hold.
As customary in the literature on the FTPL, in the analysis that follows we do not consider
any explicit government objective function and, rather, take as given a set of targets for the scal
variables. What is important is that, regardless of how such scal targets are determined, the
13 In fact, constraint (18) must hold as an equality for each household. To see this, notice that if (20) holds as an
strict inequality then at least one other household would be violating his ow of dollars constraint.
14Without prior knowledge of the exact participants strategies we cannot rule out the existence of asymmetric
equilibria.
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government ex ante commits to a particular strategy, by which we mean a conditional course of
action that prescribes government actions under any conceivable eventuality.
Conditionality of government actions is a crucial feature of our environment and it is present in
the equilibrium denition given above. To see this, notice that government solvency constraints (19)
and (20) dictate that the amount of some funds owing from and to the government is determined
through the households actions. For example, as P is determined by households bids M1c and C
1
m
(see (10)), so it is the ow of goods that government delivers in terms of debt payments, BcP . In
turn, this implies that government feasible choices of scal instruments like G and T1 can only be
made meaningfully if conditional on the households actions.
4 Equilibrium determinacy under non-Ricardian Strategies
In this section we state the main result of the paper, namely, that in the context of the non-
Walrasian economy of section 3 there exist government strategies that deliver equilibrium unique-
ness. To this aim, we rst provide a formal denition for government and household strategies.
Denition 4 (strategies). A government strategy is a bid price P3 with a maximum bid C
g;3
m , a
bid price P4 with a maximum sale bid M
g;4
c ; and tax installments T1 and T2; that satisfy (20) and
(23). A household strategy is a monetary loan m; bids

c1m; c
2
m; c
4
m;m
1
c ;m
3
c ; bc
	
and a consumption
level c; that satisfy (12), (16), (17), (18), (21), and (22).
We have not included Cg;3m ;M
g;4
c ; C
g
b ; and G in the above denitions. Once the government
species C
g;3
m and M
g;4
c ; the rst two are not treated as separate choice variables. Given the no-
default assumption, Cgb can be deducted identically from (15) while G is obtained as a residual from
(23). Given the solvency constraints included in the above denition and the price equations (10),
(11), (13) and (14), we learn that a government strategy is a function of the monetary policy rule
(r;M) and aggregate households actions (C1m; C
2
m; C
4
m;M;M
1
c ;M
3
c ; Bc). A household strategy is
a function of government actions (P3; C
g;3
m ; P4;M
g;4
c ; T1; T2); the monetary policy rule and aggregate
households actions.
In the spirit of the canonical cases of section 2, we next consider two alternative government
strategies, each delivering a di¤erent outcome in terms of equilibrium determinacy. We still refer
to such alternative strategies (rather than policies) as Ricardian and non-Ricardian. Also, in order
to facilitate the comparison with the Walrasian economy, we assume that under both strategies,
the government targets a constant total tax, as measured in terms of goods, T = T1 + T2=P; and
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denote such target by eT . Also, we assume that the government seeks no participation in markets
3 and 4, thus setting eCg;3m = fMg;4c = 0; where eCg;3m and fMg;4c stand for the targeted upper trade
limit in markets 3 and 4, respectively. According to the government ow of dollars constraint (20),
this latter assumption implies that the target for the dollar-tax must satisfy eT2 = 0. Importantly,
government targets are understood as objectives to be met in equilibrium, but not necessarily out
of it. In particular, we exploit the potential deviations of both Cg;3m and M
g;4
c with respect to their
targets to provide a distinction between Ricardian and non-Ricardian strategies that specialize
the canonical denition of Ricardian and non-Ricardian policies (denition 2) to the current non-
Walrasian context.
Denition 5 (Ricardian vs non-Ricardian strategies). A government strategy is Ricardian
if C
g;3
m =M
g;4
c = 0 for any P; or, equivalently, if
G = T1 + C
2
m  
Bc
P
(24)
holds for any P:15 It is non-Ricardian if C
g;3
m =M
g;4
c = 0; i.e. (24), is only satised in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (A Ricardian scal strategy). Suppose that the government sets T = eT and
C
g;3
m = M
g;4
c = 0 for any P: Then the equilibrium price, P; and the level of government spending
are indeterminate.
Proposition 4 (A non-Ricardian scal strategy). Suppose that there exists a competitive
equilibrium with T = eT ; Cg;3m = Mg;4c = 0; and G = eG; where eG is a government exogenous target
for G. Then, there exists a government strategy such that the unique equilibrium contains T = eT ;
G = eG; and Cg;3m =Mg;4c = 0:
We describe below the intuition behind these propositions and relegate the complete proof to
the appendix.
Regardless of the particular government strategy, household optimal behavior requires that
(12), (16), (18), (21) and (22) hold as equalities. When (21) and (16) hold as equalities the
household does not leave unconsumed goods and redeems all his bonds, respectively. Also, as
r > 0; it is not optimal to borrow more dollars from the central bank than strictly needed to
acquire consumption goods and, hence, (12) and (22) both must hold as equalities in the solution
of the household maximization problem. Likewise, it cannot be optimal to end up with a positive
15As in the analysis of section 2, hereafter we restrict the set of potential prices P  Pmin:
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amount of dollars so that (18) holds as an equality, as well. Also, optimal individual household bids
imply that the aggregate counterparts M1c ; C
1
m; C
2
m are such that that P = P2, for otherwise there
would exist opportunities to increase individual consumption. Thus, in equilibrium, the following
set of equalities, that include the latter condition P = P2 plus the aggregate counterparts of (12),
(16), (21) and (22), hold
P = P2
M = M1c +M
3
c
B = Bc
C = 1 +
M1c
P
+
M3c
P3
+
Bc
P
  T1   C1m   C2m   C4m
M + PC1m + P2C
2
m + P4C
4
m = (1 + r)M +M
1
c +M
3
c + T2
C =
M1c
P
+
M3c
P2
+
Bc
P
(25)
Consider rst the Ricardian strategy of proposition 3. Such strategy implies that at stage 3 the
government simply adjusts its level of spending so that (23) holds as an identity for any price P ,
since there are no other available actions given the price-invariant tax policy and the commitment
to not participate in markets 3 and 4. Then, the argument in proposition 1 applies here too. That
is, for any price P  Pmin; we can nd an allocation that satises the government constraints (20)
and (23), markets 1 and 2 clearing conditions (10) and (11), respectively, and all the equalities in
(25), after imposing M3c = C
4
m = 0:
Next, we provide an example of a government non-Ricardian strategy that delivers equilib-
rium uniqueness in the context of proposition 4. Of course, we do not claim that such strategy
is the only one that produces that result. In order to emphasize the di¤erences with respect the
previous Ricardian strategy, in what follows, we name an arbitrary price level P and verify that
there exist feasible government actions that rule out such price as an equilibrium one even if each
household follows a strategy such that all the equalities in (25) hold (case 1 below). We then
complete the strategy by considering the case in which at least one equality in (25) does not hold
(case 2 below).
Case 1 (non-Ricardian deviations). Let us rst compute the price level, eP ; in the com-
petitive equilibrium in which government actions coincide with their targets to nd that
eP = B " eT + r
1 + r
  eG# 1 (26)
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which naturally coincides with the FTPL canonical solution in proposition 2. Assuming that all the
equalities in (25) hold, let us dene the government excess surplus, denoted by X, as the di¤erence
between the target eG and the level of government spending that would result, for a given P , under
the Ricardian strategy of proposition 3, which we denote by GR; for Ricardian. Then, using the
government ow of funds equation (23) and markets 1 and 2 clearing conditions, we can express
the excess surplus as
X  GR   eG = B 1eP   1P

(27)
which is positive (negative) for P > (<) eP ; reecting the fact that the real value of government debt
is positively linked to the value of the dollar. Let us consider the following government strategy,
distinguishing across the two possible contingencies outlined above, i.e. P > eP and P < eP :
1. Low transactions value of money. Suppose rst that the price in the private market is
P > eP , i.e. there is a positive excess surplus. Then, the government sets a scal value of money
P 13 = P
 1 + dm, for dm > 0; i.e. it is willing to purchase dollars giving goods in exchange and
paying a more advantageous price than the private market does. Such an action is feasible, in the
sense that it respects the government resource constraint (19) for any size of the aggregate bid
M3c < M; as long as dm is not too high. A particularly simple specication that meets the latter
requirement under any circumstance is dm = X=M: In words, the government is willing to pay a
price premium for each dollar in the economy by distributing the excess surplus across the entire
money stock.16 Thus, as P > eP the government uses the inow of goods in excess of its planned
expenditure to increase the total demand for dollars. Critically it does so in a way that makes
suboptimal, from a household perspective, to supply dollars in the private market: the household
could consume more by submitting the same amount of dollars to market 3. Hence, under this
strategy there cannot be an equilibrium with P > eP :
The remaining actions of the government are as follows. It sets T = T1 = eT and T2 = eT2 = 0, i.e.
when facing a positive unplanned surplus the government need not to increase taxes, distributing
the extra unplanned surplus using goods sale bids in market 3 instead. Also, the government sets
a scal value of goods P4 = P with M
g;4
c = M
3
c ; which allows the inow of dollars obtained in
market 3 to remain in the economy so that initial central bank loans can be fully repaid in stage
3, thus respecting the assumption that the government ow of dollars constraint (20) holds as an
equality. Also, as the government obtains 1=P goods per dollar received in market 3 and supplied
in market 4, it nances a portion P 1 of the scal value P 13 that is not nanced out of the excess
surplus (this latter portion is dm).
16Thus, the government does not need to impose an explicit upper bound, C
g;3
m .
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Government spending, which is derived mechanically from (23), satises
G = eT + r 1 G  B
P

  B
P
 M3c dm = eG+X   11 + rM3c dm (28)
where the term r [1 G B=P ] corresponds to seigniorage and the second equality follows from the
denition of the excess surplus in (27). Equation (28) makes explicit that government expenditure
at an o¤-equilibrium price P > eP is strictly larger than the target in an amount corresponding to
the undistributed excess surplus, X   11+rM3c dm:17
Finally, the government ceases to participate in markets 3 and 4, thus setting C
g;3
m =M
g;4
c = 0,
when P = eP :
2. High transactions value of money. Consider a price P < eP : The government reacts by
making a dollars sale bid at a lower price, in terms of goods, than the one prevailing in the private
market. An obvious valid example of such price is P4 = eP : Feasibility of that bid requires that the
government obtains ePC4m dollars for a given aggregate household bid C4m, which can be done by
setting a tax T2 = ePC4m and not participating in market 3, i.e. Cg;3m = 0.18 This ensures that the
ow of dollars constraint (20) holds for any P .
As regards the choice of T1; we consider two separate cases:
i) If P; while lower than eP , is su¢ ciently high (in the precise sense given below), then the
government can follow a tax policy that keeps total taxes at their targeted level, eT , by reducing
T1 to compensate a positive T2; i.e. T1 = eT   ePP C4m: In that case the budget constraint (23) reveals
that G satises
G = eT   eP
P
C4m + r

1 G  B
P

  B
P
+ C4m =
eG+X   1
1 + r
C4mdc (29)
where dc, which is dened as dc  ePP  1; represents the premium paid by the government on goods
in market 4 with respect to the price prevailing in the private market. However, a constant level of
taxation eT is feasible only as long as government spending resulting from (29) takes non-negative
values. In particular, a tax policy that sets T = eT ceases to be feasible if P < P0; where P0 is the
price level that, for a given C4m, makes G = 0 in (29). Exploiting this latter condition together
17The undistributed excess surplus includes the increase in seigniorage due to the correspondingly larger monetary
injections required to sustain households bids in market 3, as dictated by (12). Such positive variation in seigniorage
amounts to r
1+r
M3c dm: Thus, total undistributed surplus becomes X   11+rM3c dm:
18As we assume an unlimited ability by the government to collect taxes in the form of dollars, it does not need to
impose an upper limit to the volume of dollar sale bids in market 4 to guarantee its solvency in that trading post.
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Figure 2: Non-Ricardian deviations
with (26) and (27), we can write P0 as
P0 =
(1 + r)BeT + r   C4mdc (30)
ii) If P < P0, the government sets G = 0 and raises taxes T1 as much as required to redeem
bonds at their face value. Specically, the level of T1 that is consistent with the government budget
(23) as G = 0 and (25) holds is given by
T1 =
B
P
  r

1  B
P

  C4m (31)
Thus, in both cases i) and ii), as dc > 0, the government strategy rules out any P < eP .
Figure 2 depicts graphically the set of government actions just described. The upper panel
contains the level of government spending consistent with the strategy just described (solid line)
as a function of the private market price, P  Pmin, and for some given households bids M3c and
C4m. This panel also depicts the function G
R (discontinuous line). The lower panel contains the
total level of taxation, T; specifying whether the government collects taxes in the form of dollars
(T2 > 0) or not (T2 = 0). For prices higher than eP ; like P 00, the government keeps taxes at their
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target, T1 = eT and T2 = 0: Tax inaction in this region is a feasible choice because, on the one hand,
at a price P 00, the government would receive more goods than strictly necessary to pay its debt and
maintain a non-negative level of spending and, on the other, because the government is willing to
sell goods in market 3. For prices falling within the interval [P0; eP ); like P 0 in the gure, total taxes
are set at their target, eT ; but now the government must deviate from the targeted tax-composition,
as in this price-region the government is willing to sell dollars in market 4, which are obtained by
raising T2 above the target. For prices in the interval [Pmin; P0) the non-negativity constraint on G
is binding and the government is forced to adjust total taxes so as to make feasible its commitment
to buy goods at a price with a positive premium with respect to the private market. In all cases,
given the tax choices, the government must set a level of spending that falls below the one that
would correspond to a Ricardian plan, i.e. GR = eG+X:19
It is worth stressing that, like in the FTPL, with this government strategy the government
avoids a scal policy that mechanically links the total scal surplus (T   G + S) to the real
value of its debt. On the contrary, as the government allows for trade in markets 3 and 4 in the
way just described, nothing ensures that (24) holds under every circumstance. We hence refer
to the deviations of the government actions with respect to their targets in markets 3 and 4 as
non-Ricardian, as opposed to the case analyzed next.
Case 2 (Ricardian deviations). Consider the case in which at least one of the equalities
in (25) holds as a strict inequality. If so, then, at least one household is not behaving optimally
and the corresponding allocation and price level cannot be part of an equilibrium, regardless of
whether the government participates in markets 3 and 4. Although the government is forced
to react in such eventuality in order to satisfy its budget constraint, it can do so by means of
a pure Ricardian adjustment, i.e. adjusting its primary surplus to guarantee solvency without
participating in market 3 or 4. For example, if Bc < B (i.e. some households fail to redeem their
entire stock of bonds) the government will face an unplanned decrease in its goods outow equal
to (B  Bc) =P . It can commit to distribute such extra resources uniformly across households by
simply reducing taxes and does not need to implement a non-Ricardian action, as in case 1 above,
to rule out such eventuality as an equilibrium.
19Notice that the vertical distance between the G and GR schedules can be made arbitrarily small by setting low
(while positive) values for dm and dc (by e.g. scaling down those given in the main text by a constant term arbitrarily
close to zero). This illustrates two interesting features of this government strategy. First, if dm and dc are close to
zero, the government may maintain the targeted level of taxes, eT ; like in the Ricardian strategy of proposition 3,
and set G close to GR too. Thus, both the non-Ricardian and Ricardian strategies would be almost observationally
equivalent with respect to the response of the primary surplus to changes in P . Yet, in the former case, there is only
one equilibrium price. Second, as dm and dc are small, so it is the net (o¤-equilibrium) consumption of resources
needed by the government to sustain its bids in markets 3 and 4.
21              BANCO DE ESPAÑA   29 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0741 
The following tax adjustment, T , that takes into account the possibility that, due to subopti-
mal households actions, the ows of goods corresponding to debt redemption and seigniorage di¤er
from the ones compatible with (25), makes the government strategy feasible in such an event,
T =
Bc  B
P
+ r

1 G  B
P

  M
P2

(32)
The rst term on the RHS captures the downwards adjustment in the government outow of
goods due to a suboptimal households bid Bc < B. The second term represents the corresponding
variation in seigniorage that arises when some households bids are such that at least one equality
in (25) does not hold.
We are now in a position to write down the complete government strategy that nests the two
types of potential deviations analyzed above.
Corollary to proposition 4 (a non-Ricardian strategy). If the government adopts the
following strategy, then there exists a unique competitive equilibrium with T = eT ; T2 = 0; G = eG;
C
g;3
m =M
g;4
c = 0, and P = eP ,
If P
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
> eP , set P3 =  P 1 + dm 1 ; dm = XM ; P4 = P ; Mg;4c =M3c ; T2 = 0; T = eT +T
= eP , set Cg;3m = 0; Mg;4c = 0; T2 = 0; T = eT +T
2 [P0; eP ); set Cg;3m = 0; P4 = eP ; T2 = ePC4m; T1 = eT   ePP C4m +T
2 [Pmin; P0); set Cg;3m = 0; P4 = eP ; T2 = ePC4m; T1 = BP   r  1  BP   C4m +T
5 Discussion
In this section we rst discuss the previous determinacy result in the light of some arguments
contained in the previous literature and check the potential of our approach to clarify some of
the most controversial questions around the FTPL, focusing on the nature of the government
intertemporal budget equation and the scalist stock analogy. Then, we comment on some possible
extensions.
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5.1 This paper and the FTPL
Equilibrium conditions versus budget constraints. At the core of the denition of a non-
Ricardian policy is the idea that the government intertemporal budget constraint (2) may not hold
for some prices, thus admitting that it is an equilibrium condition rather than an identity. Buiter
(2002) argues that such a view is an economic misspecication. The approach followed here o¤ers
a neat resolution to this controversy. Equation (23) is a budget constraint that must be respected
both in and out of equilibrium, as stressed by Buiter. The following equation, that represents a
particular case of (23) in which all government choice variables are set at their respective targeted
values and all the equalities in (25) hold,
eG = eT + r1  eG  B
P

  B
P
(33)
is an equilibrium condition if the government commits to the non-Ricardian strategy presented
above. As such, it only holds for a single price, eP .
There is an obvious similarity between the role played by the transversality condition (Bs = 0)
in the arguments put forward by the proponents of the FTPL and our approach. In the former case
Bs is allowed to take values di¤erent from zero under some contingencies, much as in our economy
the terms C4m and
M3c
P3
in (23) are allowed to take positive values. Yet there are two critical
di¤erences with respect to the FTPL. First, G and T in (23) need not to coincide with their
targeted values (indeed, they will not coincide for most prices) since some government actions
must necessarily be conditional on households actions. Second, in our setting the government
defeats some prices as equilibrium ones through feasible actions in markets 3 and 4. This is in
clear contrast with the idea that the government can rule out some potential equilibria by creating
an excess supply of irredeemable bonds.
The scalist stock-analogy. The non-Ricardian strategy outlined above prescribes a gov-
ernment action in the event of a price P > eP similar to the one considered by Wallace (1981)
and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1983), as the government uses its unplanned surplus to avoid an exces-
sive depreciation of the dollar. It may be argued, along the lines of Cochrane (2005) and Sims
(1999), that a dollar then becomes a residual claim to the government surplus. In fact, under this
perspective, the di¤erence between the transactions and the scal value of a dollar (dm) can be
seen as a dividend paid to money holders that sell dollars in market 3. However, as opposed to
the FTPL, the government strategy considered here is successful in ruling out potential equilibria
with P > eP precisely because the government does not commit to keep G and T simultaneously
23              BANCO DE ESPAÑA   31 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0741 
at their targeted levels in view of P: As the government o¤ers the possibility of delivering goods
in exchange for dollars, it must let its level of expenditure go above the target as long as such
possibility is not fully exhausted. In other words, the government must allow for undistributed
prots when P > eP .
In our economy, the previous device does not work symmetrically, however. The announcement
by the government that it will pay a price per dollar lower than what the private market is already
paying (say, by setting dm < 0 in market 3) need not have any e¤ect. In the event of a price
P < eP ; the non-Ricardian strategy outlined before indicates that the government engineers a plan
that results in a depreciation of the dollar while avoiding a direct monetization of the decit, as in
the scal-dominance case of Sargent and Wallace (1981). This is done be means of a dividend on
goods, dc, paid in market 4.
Thus, the idea that a government may unconditionally stick to a low scal surplus in the hope
that the price level will automatically rise enough so as to erode the real value of its obligations does
not apply here. Specically, scalist hyperinations as the one highlighted by Kocherlakota and
Phelan (1999) as a FTPLs anomaly, along which money becomes valueless because the government
plans a stream of zero surpluses in face of a positive initial debt are not possible in our environment.
If a rms shares are valued because e.g. they facilitate transactions, in addition to being a residual
claim of the rms prots, then the rm may go bankrupt but its shares may still have a positive
value. This last point illustrates an important di¤erence between a cash-less economy, in which
money only exists as a unit of account, and the monetary economy of this paper. In the former, if
the government runs a zero surplus, hence no o¤ering any positive amount of goods in exchange for
a maturing dollar-denominated bond, both the bond and the dollar (as unit of account) must be
valueless in equilibrium. In a genuine monetary economy, a zero total surplus may be compatible
with a situation in which dollars (as mean of exchange) are still positively valued while the bond
is not (i.e. in such a case the government must default on its debts).
5.2 Limitations and extensions
We have make a number of seemingly restrictive assumptions. Specically, we have considered taxes
that are payable in goods and bonds that give their holders the right to redeem them directly in
exchange for goods. Both assumptions have direct consequences on the government budget, in
the sense that by removing the need for using money to repay bonds and to meet the goods-tax
obligation, total seigniorage is likely to fall (recall that in all the equilibria analyzed in the paper,
money is only used to overcome the households liquidity constraint). Yet, none of the arguments
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of the paper hinge on the size of seigniorage. Thus, we believe that validity of the class of non-
Ricardian strategies presented in this paper would extend to a richer environment featuring taxes
that are only payable in dollars, government bonds that promise to deliver dollars at maturity and,
possibly, a liquidity constraint a¤ecting government spending.
We have also ruled out the possibility of any form of intra-period credit except monetary
loans made by the central bank to the households. Such assumption poses somewhat unrealistic
constraints to the government. In particular, in our economy the central bank does not accept
government bonds in exchange for dollars and the government cannot borrow money directly from
the central bank or the private sector. If anything, introducing these forms of government credit
would tend to provide the government with extra tools to implement its scal targets through a
non-Ricardian strategy.
We believe that the most interesting extension is the introduction of multiple periods and,
possibly, an innite horizon economy. Such extension would allow for intertemporal trade being
implemented through sales of new government bonds. Then, trade that in our stylized model
occurs in markets 3 and 4, could be envisaged as taking place in a newly-issued debt market. That
is, rather than committing to contemporaneous deliveries of goods and dollars in markets 3 and 4,
respectively, the government could then trade promises of future deliveries of these objects.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we show that there exist feasible scal strategies that deliver a unique equilibrium
price level under an interest rate peg. Such scal strategies satisfy a government intertemporal
budget constraint under any circumstance, thus departing from the scal theory of the price level
that, in some cases, asserts that such constraint can be violated while, in others, denies its existence.
Still, the along the scal strategies considered in this paper the government avoids a scal policy
that mechanically links its surplus to the real value of its outstanding nominal debt, much in the
spirit of the standard scal theory.
The non-Ricardian scal strategies analyzed here share some features with a number of studies
on equilibrium selection mechanisms in the monetarist tradition, like those in Wallace (1981) and
Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1983). As in those papers, there are potentially more than one equilibrium
and the government targets a particular one. To achieve its scal targets, the government reacts
to an excessive depreciation of the currency by selling goods in exchange for dollars in a way
that creates divergence of prices across di¤erent markets for the same items. Conversely, the
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government buys goods in exchange for dollars to rule out potential equilibria in which the value
of the dollar is above the one consistent with its targets. We show that such scal actions can be
implemented without resorting to direct monetization of the decit, thus respecting the assumption
of independent scal and monetary authorities. In terms of the game of chickenof Sargent and
Wallace (1981), under a non-Ricardian strategy the scal branch of the government blinks for all
prices but one: the equilibrium one.
The theory of this paper rests heavily on the description of the actions taken by the government
out of the equilibrium. To provide a transparent distinction between restrictions that must be
respected even out of equilibrium versus genuine equilibrium conditions, we cast our arguments
into a model of a non-Walrasian monetary economy in which the price formation mechanism is
explicitly modelled.
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Appendix: Proof of claims in section 4
Proof of proposition 3.
Given a government strategy that includes T = eT and Cg;3m = Mg;4c = 0; a symmetric equilib-
rium is characterized by the following set of conditions:
i) Given P; P2; r and eT ; households constraints (12), (16), (18), (21) and (22) hold as equalities,
with M3c = C
4
m = 0: Also, utility maximization requires that P = P2.
ii) The government solvency constraints (19) and (20) hold.
iii) Markets 1 and 2 clear.
We next consider an arbitrary P  Pmin and verify that there exists an equilibrium for which
the above conditions are satised. Using the equilibrium conditions B = Bc; P = P2; M = M1c ;
and M
1
c
P = C
1
m; we combine the aggregate counterpart of the households and the government ow
of goods constraints, (21) and (19), respectively, to nd that, in equilibrium, C + G = 1; i.e. all
resources are consumed. We plug this last equality into the government constraint (19) and solve
for government spending, GR :
GR =
eT + r
1 + r
  B
P
(34)
which is non-negative as long as P  Pmin (where now Pmin is understood as evaluated at T = eT ).
Thus, equilibrium households consumption satises C = 1   GR: Given P; we use the liquidity
constraint (22) to solve for the monetary stock M; to nd that M = P
 
1 GR B: Finally, we
can solve for C2m using the equilibrium condition P = P2 together with market 2 clearing condition,
to nd that C2m =
rM
P .
Proof of proposition 4.
We rst characterize the unique symmetric competitive equilibrium that contains the govern-
ment policy targets, i.e. T = eT ; G = eG; and Cg;3m = Mg;4c = 0: The solution of the households
optimization problem satises equations (12), (16), (21), (22) and (18) holding as equalities. Also,
as C
g;3
m =M
g;4
c = 0; the household optimally sets m
3
c = c
4
m = 0: Government expenditure satises
eG = eT + C2m   BeP = eT + rMeP   BeP (35)
where eP is the equilibrium price level and the second equality is obtained after combining market
clearing condition (11) with the equilibrium condition P2 = P: Then, exploiting the equilibrium
condition 1 = C+ eG together the aggregate counterpart of the liquidity constraint (22), we rewrite
(35) as
eP = B " eT + r
1 + r
  eG# 1 (36)
which is equation (26) in the text, and solve for the equilibrium money supply to nd that fM =eP 1  eG B: From the market clearing conditions (10) and (11), we obtain aggregate equilibrium
bids C1m = fM= eP and C2m = rfM= eP :
Clearly, beside the unique symmetric equilibrium, there may exist other non-symmetric ones,
since individual bids c1m and c
2
m need not coincide with the corresponding aggregate ones. That is,
two di¤erent households, say i and j, may achieve the same level of consumption in equilibrium
by making di¤erent bids in markets 1 and 2, i.e. P

c1;im + c
2;i
m

= P

c1;jm + c
2;j
m

; with c1;im 6= c1;jm .
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In order to solve for the government excess surplus, X, we combine (34) and (35), using the
equilibrium value of fM , to arrive at the expression given in the main text, X  GR   eG =
B

1eP   1P

:
We next show that there cannot be an equilibrium with P > eP if the government commits
to the non-Ricardian strategy presented in the corollary of proposition 4. We focus on the case
in which (25) holds.20 For P > eP the government participates in market 3 setting P3 such that
P 13 = P
 1 + dm and dm = X=M > 0: For any given initial central bank loan m, a household
maximizes his total utility by making a goods sale bid in an amount equal to his endowment net
of taxes. Given the government strategy, this household must be indi¤erent between supplying his
goods in markets 1, 2 or 4, as they all have the same price, P , i.e. c1m+ c
2
m+ c
4
m = 1 T . He makes
a sale bid for all his initial money holdings m to market 3; redeems all his bonds and consumes
c = mP3 +
B
P : With the dollars obtained in exchange for his goods sale bids, i.e. P
 
c1m + c
2
m + c
4
m

;
he repays the central bank loan plus interest. Hence, as P > eP > 0; some households are choosing
m1c > 0 which, as just shown, is suboptimal. In case that P < eP , the government sets P4 = eP : A
household maximizes his utility by making a goods sale bid in market 4 for an amount equal to his
endowment net of taxes, i.e. c4m = 1   T1. He makes a sale bid for all his initial money holdings
m; being indi¤erent between markets 1 and 3, as the price in both is P: He redeems all his bonds
and consumes c = (m+B) =P . Thus, making a positive goods sale bid in markets 1 or 2 is not
optimal and P < eP cannot be an equilibrium either.
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